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BOOK REVIEW
AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE WAR
ON TERRORISM
Robert F. Turnert
WAR BY OTHER MEANs: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR.

By John Yoo. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006. Pp. 292. $24.
INTRODUCTION

Professor John Yoo is a highly intelligent yet controversial legal
scholar. As a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel between 2001 and 2003, he played an
important role as a champion of presidential power during the early
days of the war on terrorism. The Washington Postwrote that Professor
Yoo is "[w] idely considered the intellectual architect of the most dramatic assertion of White House power since the Nixon era,"' and
protesters at University of California Berkeley School of Law, Boalt
Hall (where Professor Yoo now teaches), demanded that he either renounce his earlier views on the treatment of prisoners in the war on
terror or resign his professorship. 2 He did neither.
My interest in the constitutional power of the executive over national security began more than four decades ago-before John Yoo
was born-when I attended a lecture by Professor Quincy Wright.
Later, as national security adviser to a member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee during the Nixon Administration, I strongly defended executive power over the conduct of war, foreign affairs, and
intelligence. I have also written a 1700-page doctoral dissertation on
"National Security and the Constitution." So these are hardly new issues to me.
Because I believe the Founding Fathers vested in the President
considerable and often unchecked discretion in the area of national
-t

Professor Turner holds both professional and academic doctorates from the Uni-

versity of Virginia School of Law, where he cofounded the Center for National Security
Law in 1981. A former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval
War College and three-term chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security, he has served in senior staff positions in the U.S. Senate, the Departments
of Defense and State, and the White House.
I Peter Slevin, Scholar Stands by Post-9 /11 Writings on Torture, Domestic Eavesdropping,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2005, at A3.
2

Jacob Schneider, Protest Targets Law Professor's PrisonerMemo, DAILY CALIFORNIAN,

June 28, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.dailycal.org/sharticle.php?id=15545.
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security-authority that Congress has often usurped during the past
four decades-Professor Yoo's efforts to reclaim executive power in
this area have in many respects pleased me. However, Professor Yoo
and the Bush Administration have in my view gone too far in some
areas. More importantly, the Administration has all too frequently accompanied broad claims of executive power with either no public explanation or an inadequate explanation. Thus, Professor Yoo's efforts
have often left me frustrated and may well result in further discrediting some truly legitimate claims of executive power.
To Professor Yoo's credit, his book, War by Other Means, repeatedly acknowledges that he and others in the Administration "did not
explain [them] selves as clearly as [they] could have" on several critical
issues. 3 Before turning to my commentary on this very important
book, a brief review of the original understanding of constitutional
power in the area of national security may be useful.
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRYING TO ASCERTAIN THE "ORIGINAL.
UNDERSTANDING" OF THE CONSTITUTION

Words are imperfect instruments used to convey ideas. Particularly when dealing with the wording of the Constitution, it is important to understand the original meaning and intent of its words.
Although it is challenging to ascertain the subjective "original intent"
of people who lived and died more than a century ago, the Framers of
our Constitution left a treasure trove of writings that makes the search
for their understanding of the constitutional text productive, even on
issues where their opinions clearly diverged.
For example, some terms that had a clear meaning in 1787 have
largely lost that meaning over the centuries. I once read a commentary on the new Constitution by one of its strongest supporters who
described it as being "awful." Most Americans today associate the
word "awful" with something truly terrible or horrible; yet, even today,
some dictionaries record the historic meaning of "awful" as "inspiring
awe" or "filled with awe."' 4 Without an understanding of that historic
meaning, trying to understand a reference to our "awful Constitution"
is unlikely to be successful.
Similarly, phrases like "declare War ' 5 and "executive Power ' 6 had
widely understood meanings in 1787 that have largely been lost in the
3 JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANs: AN INSIDER'S Accoutr OF THE WAR ON TERROR
177 (2006); see id. at viii ("The other responsible party has been the Bush Administration.
[It] has often failed to explain clearly to the public the difficult decisions al Qaeda has
forced upon us.").
4

See, e.g.,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 86 (11th ed. 2004).

5
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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modern world. Without an appreciation of these terms as understood
when the Constitution was written, we are less likely to understand its
intended meaning.
'7

THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF "EXECUTIVE POWER"

The distinguished Professor Quincy Wright explained in his 1922
classic, The Control of American Foreign Relations, that "when the constitutional convention gave 'executive power' to the President, the foreign relations power was the essential element in the grant, but they
carefully protected this power from abuse by provisions for senatorial
or congressional veto." 8 Consider, for example, the following excerpt
from Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright's remarks at Cornell Law School in 1959:
The pre-eminent responsibilityof the President for the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy is clear and unalterable. He has, as Alexander Hamilton defined it, all powers in
international affairs "which the Constitution does not vest elsewhere
in clear terms." He possesses sole authority to communicate and
negotiate with foreign powers. He controls the external aspects of
the Nation's power, which can be moved by his will alone-the
armed forces, the diplomatic corps, the Central Intelligence
9
Agency, and all of the vast executive apparatus.
Chairman Fulbright refers not merely to the President's role in carrying out foreign policy-as if the President might be simply the agent
of Congress for the limited business of communicating with foreign
leaders-but rather recognizes the President's responsibility for the
"formulation" of policy as well. Obviously, the Senate also has an important role to play in foreign policy.' 0 Indeed, the United States cannot ratify a treaty without the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. 1
However, beyond the powers that the Constitution expressly granted
2
to the Senate or Congress-including the power to "declare War"'
and the prohibition against spending treasury funds without an appropriation made by law13-throughout most of our history there has
been a strong consensus that the President has primary responsibility
for the safety of the nation in its foreign relations.
7
8

Id.
QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERIC AN FOREIGN RELATIONS 147 (1922).

9 J. William Fulbright, American ForeignPolicy in the 20th Century Under an 18th-Century
Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 (1961).
10 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur .
II

See id.

12
13

Id. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
Id. § 9, cl.7.
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As Professor Yoo understands, there is a wealth of documentary
evidence establishing that the original understanding of "executive
Power" included the general management of foreign affairs, diplomacy, intelligence, and the conduct of war once authorized by Congress or initiated by a foreign state. Professor Yoo observes:
Article II of the Constitution also vests the president with "the executive power," which, in Justice Scalia's words, "does not mean some
of the executive power, but all of the executive power." Political
theorists at the time of the framing considered foreign affairs and
national security as quintessentially executive in nature, and our
Constitution creates an executive branch that can act with unity,
speed, and secrecy to carry out those functions effectively. Congress
has important powers, such as the power to issue rules to regulate
and govern the military, which gives it the sole authority to set the
rules of military discipline and order. But the Constitution nowhere
vests in Congress any explicit authority to dominate national security policy, nor gives it an outright veto over executive decisions in
14
the area.
While Professor Yoo is correct that the drafters of the Constitution did
not intend Congress to "dominate national security policy," the drafters did vest certain executive powers in the Senate, including its negative over treaties and diplomatic nominations. 15 Additionally, the
drafters granted other executive powers to the Congress as a check
16
against executive abuse, including the power to "declare War."
7
Thus, a more correct statement than Justice Scalia's1 would be James
Madison's description of the separation of powers: "[T]he Executive
power being in general terms vested in the President, all powers of an
Executive nature, not particularly taken away must belong to that
department .... "I"
In a reference to the famous 1793 Pacificus-Helvidiusdebate between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison over President George
Washington's decision to declare neutrality in the war between France
and Great Britain, Professor Yoo notes that Thomas Jefferson urged
Yoo, supra note 3, at 103 (citations omitted).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16
Id. Thus, in a September 1789 letter to Madison, Thomas Jefferson confirmed the
prevailing thinking when he wrote: "We have already given, in example, one effectual
check to the [d] og of war, by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay." Letter
14
15

from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). Because the Articles of Confederation

JEFFERSON,

vested all war powers in the Continental Congress, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art.
VI, Jefferson's comment clearly referred to transferring this power from its natural home
as part of the executive power to the Congress.
17
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (June 21, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 405, 405-06 n.I (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
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Madison to take up that struggle. 19 Consequently, Professor Yoo "decided to take Hamilton as [his] role model." 21 This is perhaps not the
time to argue my belief that Jefferson and Madison were essentially
"forum shopping" when they tried to shift to Congress the decision
over whether to support France in its war with Britain, but both before
and after that debate they viewed the President as the senior partner
in the nation's foreign intercourse because he held the nation's "executive power." In The FederalistNo. 47, Madison praised "the celebrated
Montesquieu" as "the oracle who is always consulted" on separation-ofpowers issues. 21 Even as Helvidius, Madison acknowledged that writers
like Montesquieu and Locke viewed foreign affairs as part of the executive power. Yet, Madison then tried to discredit them by alleging
that they were "warped by a regard to the particular government of
England, to which one of them owed allegiance; and the other pro22
fessed an admiration bordering on idolatry."
Likewise, one cannot easily reconcile Jefferson's 1793 opposition
to Hamilton's Pacificus theory with his own April 1790 memorandum
to President Washington. In responding to a query about where the
Constitution had placed decisions regarding foreign affairs and diplomacy that were not expressly addressed in the instrument, Jefferson
reasoned:
[The Constitution] ...has declared that the Executive powers shall
be vested in the President, submitting special articles of it to a negative by the Senate ....
The transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive
altogether. It belongs, then, to the head of that department, except
as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate.
23
Exceptions are to be construed strictly.
Three days later, Washington recorded this entry in his diary:
Tuesday, 27th. Had some conversation with Mr. Madison on the propriety of consulting the Senate on the places to which it would be
necessary to send persons in the Diplomatic line, and Consuls; and
with respect to the grade of the first-His opinion coincides with
Mr. [ChiefJustice John] Jay's and Mr.Jefferson's-to wit-that they
have no Constitutional right to interfere with either, and that it
might be impolitic to draw it into a precedent, their powers extending no farther than to an approbation or disapprobation of the
19

See Yoo, supra note 3, at xii.

20
21

Id.

THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22 James Madison, Helvidius Number 1, reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES
MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIus DEBATES OF 1793-1794, at 55, 58 (MortonJ. Frisch ed.,
2007) (footnote omitted).
23 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Question Whether the Senate has the Right to
Negative the Grade of Persons Appointed by the Executive to Fill Foreign Missions (Apr.
24, 1790), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 15, 16, 17 (Albert Bergh ed., 1903).
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person nominated by the President, all the rest being Executive and
24
vested in the President by the Constitution.
By this same logic, Hamilton also viewed the Executive as having
broad constitutional powers over war and foreign affairs. As Pacificus,
he wrote in 1793:
The general doctrine... of our [C]onstitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to
the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the
instrument.
It deserves to be remarked, that as the participation of the
[S]enate in the making of Treaties, and the power of the Legislature to declare war are exceptions out of the general "Executive
Power" vested in the President, they are to be construed strictlyand ought to be extended no further than is essential to their
execution.
While therefore the Legislature can alone declare war, can
alone actually transfer the nation from a state of Peace to a state of
War-it belongs to the "Executive Power," to do whatever else the
laws of Nations ...enjoin, in the intercourse of the U [nited] States
25
with foreign Powers.
Thus, Jefferson and all three authors of The FederalistPapersshared the
view that the grant of the nation's executive power in Article II, Section 1 gave the President the general control of foreign affairs subject
to narrowly construed exceptions expressly vested in the Senate or
Congress. Professor Yoo includes several excerpts from The Federalist
reaffirming the Executive's special responsibilities in the realm of foreign affairs, quoting Hamilton's observations that "[e] nergy in the executive . . .is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks," and "[o]f all the cares or concerns of government,
the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which
26
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand."
Additionally, Chief Justice John Marshall-like Hamilton, one of
Jefferson's political enemies-also expressly embraced the case for
largely unchecked executive powers over the nation's foreign intercourse in the most famous of all Supreme Court cases, Marbury v.
Madison, where he wrote in 1803:
By the [C]onstitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of
24

4 THE DIARIES OF GEORGE W'ASHINGTON: 1748-1799, at 122 (John Fitzpatrick ed.,

1925).
25

Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number I, reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON &
1793-1794, supra note 22, at 8, 13, 16.

JAMES MADISON, THE PACIFICus-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF
26

Yoo, supra note 3, at 120 (quoting

THE FEDERALIST

No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience....
*.. [A]nd whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner

in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can
exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political.
They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted
27
to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.
To illustrate this point, Marshall used the example of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, whose acts he explained "can never be examinable by
28
the courts."
Professor Yoo seeks to distinguish between "the Constitution as it
works in peacetime, when Congress authorizes a policy and the President carries it out,"29 and the Constitution during periods of author-

ized war. This approach is not particularly useful. The Constitution
prevails during war as during peace, but it allocates powers differently
between the realms of domestic and foreign affairs-even during
peacetime. As the Supreme Court noted in the landmark 1936 Curtiss-Wright case (during a period in which the United States was at
peace):
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external
affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall
said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations-a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental
power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provi30
sions of the Constitution.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 165-66 (1803).
Id.
29 Yoo, supra note 3, at 119.
30
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (emphasis
omitted).
27
28
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The President's often unchecked powers in the external realm do
not depend on a declaration or state of "war"-both of which are as
much anachronisms in the modern era as the power of Congress to
"grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" 3 1-but on the nature of the
business at hand. To the extent a matter involves America's relations
with the outside world, it is the business of the Executive, save for the
specific and narrowly construed exceptions enumerated in the Constitution. If a matter is primarily domestic and affects the rights of individual Americans, it is more likely within the province of Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL BLACKMAIL AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE

After arguing that the Constitution commits most decisions in
foreign affairs to the President's discretion, Professor Yoo suggests
that Congress is not "defenseless" and has important powers of its
own. 32 He writes: "Congress could refuse to confirm cabinet members, subcabinet members, or military intelligence officers unless it
prevails over the NSA" 33 on the terrorist surveillance program. It also
34
"has total control over funding" and "can cut off funds.
Professor Yoo is of course correct that no money may be ex35
pended from the treasury without an appropriation made by law.
Thus, if the President submits a request for additional funds to fight a
war or to purchase new spy satellites, Congress can freely refuse the
appropriation. 36 Without funds, few major policy initiatives can survive. Nevertheless, "like every other governmental power," the power
of the purse "must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
37
provisions of the Constitution."
Congress's power of the purse has its limits. Congress may not
properly condition appropriated funds on the President surrendering
to the whim of Congress discretionary authority that the Constitution
vests in the Executive. For example, just last year, the Supreme Court
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld favorably quoted Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase's 1866 explanation in Ex parte Milligan of the separation of war
powers:
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to
execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and
auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities essential to its due
exercise. But neither can the President, in war more than in peace,
intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon

32

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Yoo, supra note 3, at 122.

33
34

Id. at 125.
Id. at 122.

35

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.7.

36

See id.

37

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

31
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the conduct of campaigns.
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Congress cannot direct

Moreover, an unlimited congressional ability to control other
branches by conditional appropriations is incongruous with a system
of government founded on a separation of powers. For example,
Congress could, if the power of the purse were unlimited, condition
appropriations for the Supreme Court on the Justices appearing on
demand to discuss the resolution of pending cases, and Congress
could dictate the outcome of pending cases merely by providing that
they would not make funds for the judiciary available unless the Court
struck down an unpopular precedent or upheld a controversial
statute.
In addition, not only could Congress restrict the judiciary, but by
this same logic, Congress could control government employees as
well. For example, Congress could use this approach to bypass the
prohibition against bills of attainder in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution merely by providing that no funds could be made available to
pay the salaries of certain named government employees who had incurred the wrath of important legislators. Indeed, Congress abused
this very power during World War II by placing a rider on the Second
Deficiency Appropriations Act of 194319 prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to pay the salaries of three alleged "communists" who
worked for the government. 40 In 1946, the Supreme Court struck
down this unconstitutional bill of attainder. 4' Over the years the
Court has frequently used the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine"
to strike down legislative attempts to use the "power of the purse" to
accomplish indirectly what the Constitution prohibits the legislature
42
from doing directly.
In 1790, Thomas Jefferson raised the issue of abusing legitimate
powers to usurp the powers of another branch of government when
he noted the possibility of the Senate attempting to control executive
discretion over issues of diplomacy by "continual negatives" on the
President's ambassadorial nominees until he agreed to the Senate's
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex
38
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866)).
39
57 Stat. 552 (1943).
40
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305, 308-09 (1946). The bill contained essential money for the prosecution of the war and thus a veto could have endangered the
war effort. Fortunately, President Roosevelt used a signing statement to declare the provision without legal effect. Id. at 318. For a discussion of the recent controversy over signing
statements, see Robert F. Turner, PresidentialSigning Statements, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006,
at B04.
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 318.
42
See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
59 (2006).
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terms. 43 But Jefferson reasoned that "this would be a breach of trust,
an abuse of the power confided to the Senate, of which that body
cannot be supposed capable. ' 44 Given Professor Yoo's strong views on
protecting the President's constitutional powers, it is surprising that
45
he recognizes these indirect attacks as appropriate.
Is

THE "WAR ON TERRORISM" REALLY A WAR?

Chapter One of War by Other Means is entitled "War," and addresses whether America really is at war with al Qaeda and its allies.
Professor Yoo quotes historian Joyce Appleby as declaring that the
"war on terror" is "more a metaphor than a fact."46 Yale Law School
Professor Bruce Ackerman similarly declares that "'War on terror' is,
on its face, a preposterous expression." 47 On this issue-recognizing
that the war against al Qaeda is sui generi 48 -Professor Yoo correctly
asserts that the United States is at war. While the nation is not at war
with every terrorist group in the world, it is at war with al Qaeda, the
Taliban, and the groups that assisted them in the 9/11 attacks.
It is apparent that the United States is at war and that the "war on
terrorism" is not merely a metaphor similar to the "war on poverty,"
because Congress, the Supreme Court, and even the United Nations
have consistently recognized that the country is at war. On September
12, 2001, the day after the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council
unanimously approved Resolution 1368, 49 which denounced the attacks and reaffirmed "the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence" 50 embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter-language
not of law enforcement but of armed conflict. On that same day,
NATO's North Atlantic Council issued a unanimous statement that "if
it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the
United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one
or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered
43 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic
Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 378, 379 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1961).
44 Id. at 378, 379.
45

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

46

Yoo, supra note 3, at 2.

47

BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE

OF TERRORISM 13 (2006).
48
Yoo, supra note 3, at 17 ("[I]t is a different kind of war, with a slippery enemy that
has no territory, population, or uniformed, traditionally organized armed forces .
49
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
50
U.N. Charter art. 51, para. I ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations .... ).
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an attack against them all." 5 ' This, too, is the language of armed conflict and not of law enforcement.
On September 18, 2001, Congress-the body authorized by the
Constitution "to declare War" 52-enacted a joint resolution authorizing "the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible
for the recent attacks launched against the United States. ' 53- Again,
Congress used the language of armed conflict and not of law enforcement. The statute referenced the right of "self-defense '5 4 and declared that it satisfied the requirements of the 1973 War Powers
Resolution. 55 On September 20, 2001, President Bush went before a
joint session of Congress and declared: "On September the l1th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country."56 During this address, he repeatedly made references to the nation being at
",war."57
5
Finally, as Professor Yoo correctly observes, in its 2004 RasuP
and
59
Hamdi decisions, the Supreme Court "confirmed as a matter of law
that the war against the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban
militia was indeed a war . . . authorized by Congress." 60 In a setting
where the UN Security Council has affirmed the United States' right
of self-defense, NATO allies have joined the United States on the battlefield, and all three branches of the U.S. government have formally
asserted that the country is at "war," it seems a bit presumptuous for
American professors to proclaim that the current conflict is merely a
metaphor like the "war on poverty."
On September 25, 2001, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo
signed a legal opinion concluding that the United States was "at war"
and asserting that the President had constitutional authority to order
the use of force abroad "alone, if necessary, without Congress's authorization." 6' While some may view this statement as but another
vast claim of executive power, Yoo's assertion was accurate. When
James Madison moved on August 17, 1787, to change the draft constitution by deleting the power of Congress "to make war" and inserting
51
Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm.
52
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
53 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
54
Id. (explaining that the September 11 attacks made it "both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense").
55
Id.
56
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109
20-8.html.
57 Id.
58
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
59
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
60 Yoo, supra note 3, at 130.
61
Id. at 10-11.
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in its place the more limited power "to declare war," he justified the
change as leaving "to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."6 2 During the ensuing debate, when Rufus King of Massachusetts explained that "'make' war might be understood to 'conduct' it
which [is] an Executive function," 63 Connecticut changed its vote and
64
Madison's motion carried with it only one dissenting vote.
Indeed, even the controversial 1973 War Powers Resolution recognized the constitutional power of the President to act unilaterally in
such a setting:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to ...(3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
65
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
THE GENEVA CONVENrIONS

Professor Yoo's second chapter discusses the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which have been at the center of much of the post-9/11 legal debate in America. Unfortunately, ignorance has driven the
debate. For example, some critics have sincerely argued that it is unlawful for the U.S. government to detain enemy combatants without
66
affording them a day in court and access to legal counsel.
In reality, for centuries it has been standard practice during
armed conflicts to detain enemy combatants for the duration of the
conflict. During World War II, the United States held more than
400,000 German and Italian prisoners of war (POWs) 6 7 in more than
forty American states without providing them with legal counsel or a
day in court. In the Vietnam War, American pilots were imprisoned
without due process as POWs in North Vietnam from 1964 until 1973
without a single outcry from the United States (although America did
complain that the POWs were being tortured).
Being a prisoner of war does not carry with it any connotation of
being a wrongdoer; a POW is merely a soldier who has fallen into the
hands of the enemy. Various international conventions have sought
to assure that POWs receive humane treatment, such as requiring that
62 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
63
Id. at 319.
64
Id.
65
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2000).
See, e.g., Jacob G. Homberger, Padilla, Hamdi, and Rasul: Charge Them or Release
66
Them, The Future of Freedom Foundation Commentaries, July 16, 2004, http://www.fff.
org/comment/com0407d.asp.
See LAURENCE REES, AUSCHWITZ: A NEW HISTORY 248 (2005).
67
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they be housed away from the dangers of the battlefield and away
from health hazards.
Following World War II, the world community negotiated four
new Geneva Conventions dealing with the treatment of (1) wounded
soldiers on the battlefield; (2) wounded and shipwrecked at sea; (3)
prisoners of war; and (4) civilians under enemy control. With 194
parties, these are the most widely accepted treaties in international
law.6 8 There are also two 1977 protocols dealing with international
and noninternational conflicts, and a 2005 protocol establishing distinctive emblems to identify religious and medical personnel as
noncombatants.
Of primary relevance in the war against terrorism is the third
1949 treaty, the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, which in Article 4 bases POW status on membership in the
armed forces of a party to the conflict or membership in a militia
group that meets four criteria, including "conducting their operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war."'69 As Professor Yoo
admits, determining the status of Taliban combatants is "a much more
difficult question" 70 than determining the status of al Qaeda combatants, who most agree are not entitled to POW status.
At its core, the status of Taliban combatants turned on whether
the United States had gone to war against the country of Afghanistan
or had entered the territory of Afghanistan to fight against an armed
nongovernmental organization that had seized control over much of
the country. During the Vietnam War, the United States had no diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam,
but everyone recognized that there was a de facto government in Hanoi that was a party to the Geneva Conventions. Although Professor
Yoo asserts that just before the start of the war in Afghanistan the State
Department asserted that "It]here is no functioning central government" in Afghanistan, 71 the State Department later maintained that
Taliban combatants should be entitled to the full protections of the
Third Convention.
The UN Security Council complicated matters when it passed a
series of resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter that clearly refused to recognize the Taliban as the de jure or de facto government
68

See

INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STATE PARTIES TO THE FOLLOWING INTERNA-

LAW AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES AS OF 12-Ocr-2007, at 1, 6
(2007), http://v/www.cicr.org/IHL.nsf/ (SPF) /partmain_treaties/$File/IHL-andother_
relatedTreaties.pdf.
69 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(2)(d),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
70 Yoo, supra note 3, at 26.
71
Id. at 27.
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of Afghanistan. 72 Rather, the resolutions referred to the Taliban as
"the Afghan faction known as the Taliban." 73 While officers in the
Peoples' Army of (North) Vietnam (PAVN) held commissions from
their government, wore uniforms with identifiable insignia, and
viewed themselves as members of the national armed forces, it was far
less clear that Taliban combatants held any such commissions or
thought of themselves as more than the military arm of a religious
force that had taken over much of the territory of Afghanistan. Unlike other national armies, Taliban combatants wore no uniforms or
national insignia to identify themselves as members of a national
army. In the end, a decision was made that the Taliban combatants
did not qualify for POW protections as members of the national
armed forces of Afghanistan; because they did not wear a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" or "conduct[ ] their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war," the Taliban

combatants did not qualify for protection as a "militia" or "volunteer
'74

corps.
Excluding the Taliban from the full protections of the Third Geneva Convention, however, does not end the debate. Common Article 3, included in all four 1949 Geneva Conventions, provides minimal
standards of protection "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties." 75 These included:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
76
degrading treatment.
Professor Yoo incorrectly seems to argue that Common Article 3
does not apply to the war on terrorism: "Bush administration critics
72
See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).
73
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 72,
1; S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 72.
74
Geneva Convention, supra note 69, art. 4(2)(b), (d).
75
Id. art. 3.
76
Id.
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make the erroneous claim that U.S. treatment of al Qaeda terrorists
violates common article 3.... That reading ignores the text of the
Geneva Conventions itself, which says that these requirements apply
only to conflicts 'not of an international character.'77 He appears to
theorize that the war on terror is an "international" conflict because it
is taking place on the territory of more than one Party to the conventions and involves armed forces from several sovereign States. 78 But
Article 2 states that the full Third Geneva Convention applies to
armed conflicts arising "between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties" to the convention, not to conflicts that merely take place on
two or more sovereign states' territories. 79 All of the sovereign States
involved in the war on terrorism are on the same side. And Common
Article 3 applies "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." 8 ° Narrowly reading this language to require that the
conflict take place "in the territory of one"-and only one-of the
"High Contracting Parties"8 1 could admittedly support Professor Yoo's
interpretation. He writes: "Common article 3 did not apply to al
Qaeda because it is not fighting an internal civil war with the American government. The 9/11 attacks and the struggle with al Qaeda
represented an international armed conflict that extended beyond
the territory of the United States."8 2 While the Geneva Conventions'
drafters may have focused on civil war settings when they wrote Common Article 3, the operative language is "conflict not of an international character." 83 The term "international" refers not to the
conflict's location but rather to the presence of sovereign states on
84
both sides of the conflict.
Although there is considerable evidence in the travaux
prparatoiresthat the drafters of Common Article 3 wrote it to deal only
with civil wars or revolutions within the territory of a single state, 85 the
77
78
79
80
81

Yoo, supra note 3, at 25 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 26-27.
Geneva Convention, supra note 69, art. 2.
Id. art. 3.
Id.
82
Yoo, supra note 3, at 25-26.
83
Geneva Convention, supra note 69, art. 3.
84
See id.
85
For example, Pictet's Commentary on the 1949 Geneva Conventions-published by
the International Committee of the Red Cross-is replete with references to Common
Article 3 as addressing "civil wars," "insurrections," and armed conflicts "of an internal
character." I JEAN S. PICrET, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 38-43 (1952) (using "civil war" well over a dozen times, along with "armed conflicts . . . of an internal
character," "insurrections," "social or revolutionary disturbances," and conflicts "within the
borders of a state"); see also G.I.A.D. Draper, HumanitarianLaw and InternalArmed Conflicts,
13 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 253, 268 (1983) (describing Common Article 3 as "the sole
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"ordinary meaning" 86 of the language strongly suggests it applies to
transnational armed conflicts in which sovereign states are not involved on both sides. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions presumably included the reference to a noninternational conflict taking
place in the territory of a treaty party to omit conflicts that occurred
outside the territory of any party to the convention, as the treaty could
not impose obligations on nonparty states.
Similarly, the participation of Great Britain and numerous other
sovereign states and treaty partners in the war on terrorism does not
make it an international conflict. The key consideration is whether
the conflict is "between" two or more sovereign states. If it is, the full
Geneva Conventions apply; if it is not, then only the minimal protections of Common Article 3 apply. In its 2006 Hamdan decision, the
Supreme Court held that Common Article 3 does apply to the war on
terrorism, which for purposes of U.S. law currently settles the
87
matter.
In the alternative, Professor Yoo notes: "Al Qaeda violates every
rule and norm developed over the history of war. Flagrant breach by
one side of a bargain generally releases the other side from the obligation to observe its end of the bargain."88 In most settings, reciprocity
is indeed an important principle of international law. It was an expressed condition in many of the early drafts to Common Article 3,
but in the end it was dropped.8 9 The doctrine of reprisal also permits
one party to a treaty to lawfully violate its treaty obligation in response
to a prior material breach by the other party. However, Article 13 of
the Third Geneva Convention expressly prohibits reprisals against
POWs.9 0

Finally, in his Epilogue, Professor Yoo suggests that Congress
"could pass a one-sentence amendment to the [Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice] . .. making clear that the Geneva Conventions, not even

common article 3, do not apply to the war on terrorism." 9 1 True
enough, and under the "latest in time" rule, 9 2 American courts would
be bound by the amended statute rather than the earlier treaty. Howarticle in each of the four Conventions that deals exclusively with so-called 'internal armed
conflicts'").
86

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.

331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
87 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2757 (2006) ("The term 'conflict not of
an international character' is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations."

(quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 69, art. 3)).
88 Yoo, supra note 3, at 23.
89
See 1 PICTET, supra note 85, at 41, 51-52.
90
Geneva Convention, supra note 69, art. 13 ("Measures of reprisal against prisoners
of war are prohibited.").
91 Yoo, supra note 3, at 235.
92 See Whimey v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888).
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ever, such a statute would not alter the fact that the United States
would still be violating its solemn treaty commitments. Indeed, because torture and the inhumane treatment of detainees during war
are war crimes, there is at least some risk that legislators who supported such an amendment might someday be subjected to warcrimes prosecutions by one of the 193 other states who are parties to
93
the conventions.
ASSASSINATIONS AND TARGETED KILLINGS

Professor Yoo's third chapter addresses the issue of "assassination" and discusses such examples as the November 4, 2002, use of a
Predator drone to fire a Hellfire missile in Yemen to kill Abu Ali al9 4
Harithi and five other al Qaeda operatives.
In the interest of full disclosure, I should acknowledge that I authored an article in the Washington Post in October 1990 that helped
to initiate the modern debate on this issue.9 5 In that article, I argued
that using lethal force in self-defense against the mastermind of a major act of ongoing international aggression was neither "assassination"
(generally defined as a form of murder) nor illegal. 96 Eight years
later, I penned a similar article for USA Today arguing that Osama bin
Laden was a lawful target.9 7 Not surprisingly, I agree with Professor
Yoo that it is permissible to kill enemy leaders as well as their underlings during wartime so long as the weapon used is lawful. There may
be serious issues concerning the permissible level of collateral damage, 98 but states may lawfully kill enemy combatants and their leaders
during wartime. To mention but one precedent, during World War II
the United States intentionally targeted an aircraft carrying Admiral
Yamamoto. 9 9

Professor Yoo notes that some critics point to the prohibition
contained in Executive Order 12,333 against "assassination" by anyone
employed by or working on behalf of the U.S. Government. 10 0 As the
senior White House attorney charged specifically with enforcing that
Executive Order after President Reagan promulgated it in December
1981 until my departure to the Department of State in 1984, I am
See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 68, at 2-6.
SeeYoo, supra note 3, at 48-49; see also id. at 48 (identifying al-Harithi as involved in
planning the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole).
95
Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1990, at
D1.
96
See id.
97
See Robert F. Turner, In Self-Defense, U.S. Has Right to Kill Terrorist bin Laden, USA
TODAY, Oct. 26, 1998, at 17A.
98
For a useful discussion of some of these limitations, see Yoo, supra note 3, at 64-69.
99 See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum ofLaw: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,ARMY
LAw., Dec. 1989, at 4, 5 (authored by my good friend).
100 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 51-52.
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confident that the President did not intend it to prevent the intentional killing of enemy leaders during wartime. Although the Executive Order does not define "assassination," the term clearly does not
encompass killings in legitimate self-defense. 10 1
Surprisingly, in this chapter Professor Yoo confuses legitimate
acts of self-defense with assassinations. In discussing America's right
to attack Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi in 1986 in response to Libyan terrorism, Professor Yoo writes: "Of course, under this rule, the
targeting of the White House and Pentagon on 9/11 was legal, although the method of the attack was not because of the hijacking of
civilian airliners." 0 2 I disagree profoundly. As the leader of a sovereign state, Qadhafi had certain rights under international law. These
did not include the right to order terrorist attacks on foreigners, but
they did include the right-the same right President Reagan exercised on April 15, 1986 0 3-to authorize necessary and proportional
acts of self-defense in response to an armed attack by another state.
As a nongovernmental organization, al Qaeda has no lawful right
under international law to use force of any kind against the United
States.
THE

PATRIOT

ACT

Professor Yoo correctly asserts that "FDR took far more liberties
with the constitutional law of the day than the current administration
does."10 4 Unlike any of his wartime predecessors, President Bush responded to the 9/11 attacks by immediately going to Congress and
requesting additional statutory authority for the war on terrorism.
The result was the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).105 Professor Yoo devotes a useful chapter to this legislative response to 9/11,
asserting that all initial proposals for legislative change came not from
political appointees but from career government lawyers. 10 6 Many of
the proposals sought to apply authorities that other governmental
agencies had used against organized crime or drug dealers and which
courts had upheld. 10 7 Additionally, the Justice Department had previ101
See Robert F. Turner, It's Not Really "Assassination".Legal and Moral Implications of
Intentionally Targeting Terrorists and Aggressor-State Regime Elites, 37 U. RiCH. L. REv. 787,
791-98 (2003).
102 Yoo, supra note 3, at 64.
103 For details of the 1986 U.S. attack on Libya, see Robert F. Turner, InternationalLaw,
the Use of Force, and Reciprocity: A Comment on ProfessorHiggins' Overview, 25 ATLANTIC COMMUNITY Q., Summer 1987, at 160, 165-67.
104 Yoo, supra note 3, at 222.
105 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
106
See Yoo, supra note 3, at 71.
107 See id. at 76.
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ously requested several of the proposals under presidents of both
parties. 108

The Patriot Act provision for roving wiretaps' °9 is a good example
of Congress bringing American counterintelligence into the twentyfirst century. Traditionally, court orders authorized the monitoring of
a single telephone line or a single e-mail account. ' " Modern
criminals often buy several prepaid cellular telephones and discard
each after a few hours of use." I' They also often change their e-mail
accounts regularly. There was every reason to suspect terrorists might
use the same tactics, so Congress responded with section 206 of the
Patriot Act which authorized the surveillance of any phone or e-mail
account used by a designated individual."l 2 Permitting United States
counter-terrorism agents to use tools already approved for law-enforcement use against organized crime and white-collar criminals
hardly constituted a major new threat to civil liberties.
A greatly overstated allegation was that section 215 of the Patriot
Act authorized the government to examine the library records of citizens. In reality, as Professor Yoo recognizes, section 215 did not even
mention libraries.1 13 Rather, section 215 permits the government to
obtain "business records"-documents courts have long held are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment' 14-through the use of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant issued by a federal
judge. 1 5 For years, grand juries have been able to obtain these same
1 16
types of records without warrants.
Why would the government wish to examine library records? Because the 9/11 terrorists used public library computers in preparation
for their attacks. 1 17 Allowing FBI investigators to examine library
records pursuant to judicial warrants could help prevent the next attack and save thousands of lives. Professor Yoo notes that the librarians' claim to an exemption would give them the kind of privilege
currently limited to communications with doctors, lawyers, priests,
108
109

See id. at

71.

USA PATRIOT Act § 206.
110 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 78.
III
See Michelle Krish, Criminals Now Using PrepaidCell Phones as Weapons, 10NEWS.COM,
May 4, 2007, http://www.10news.com/newsarchive/13262329/detail.html.
112
See USA PATRIOT Act § 206; Yoo, supra note 3, at 78-79.
113
See Yoo, supra note 3, at 78 ("[Section 215] applies to all businesses that keep
records, of which libraries are only one.").
114 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) ("This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.").
115
See USA PATRIOT Act § 215.
116 See Yoo, supra note 3, at 77.
117
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and spouses,' 18 which makes little sense given the stakes in the war on
terrorism.
Of course, given the speed with which the Patriot Act was put
together and rushed through Congress, the statute is certainly not
perfect. Over time, Congress will no doubt make appropriate adjustments, increasing governmental authorities in some areas and narrowing them in others. Regardless, I believe Professor Yoo does a good
job in explaining and defending the statute.
WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Chapter Five addresses "The NSA and Wiretapping." However,
the chapter provides little substantive information on the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP) because, as Professor Yoo writes, 'Justice
Department officials have prohibited [him] from responding directly
to the accounts in the New York Times and in other papers. " 1t 9
In his introduction, Professor Yoo asserts that "[o]n the surveillance issue, the Bush administration had learned, to its credit, a few
lessons from the torture controversy. It came out with a full legal justification of its actions."' 120 If only that were true. Though the Department ofJustice prepared an impressive legal memorandum seeking to
defend the TSP, the authors focused primarily on statutory issues
rather than the far stronger constitutional arguments. 12 1 Clearly,
Congress intended FISA to be the sole means of authorizing national
security wiretaps inside the United States. 122 Section 109(a) makes it
a felony to engage in "electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute."'123 The Department ofJustice arguedwith almost no apparent success based on public discourse and media
accounts-that when Congress passed the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF) on September 18, 2001,124 Congress authorized the President to collect foreign intelligence on al Qaeda. Legislators quickly dismissed this interpretation, noting that they had not
intended to modify FISA by voting for the AUMF.
In reality, the Justice Department presented a reasonable statutory argument in support of a presidential power to collect foreign
intelligence. Certainly, when Congress enacted the AUMF, few mem118
119
120

See id.
Id. at 100.
Id. at ix.

121 See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to
William H. Frist, Senate Majority Leader, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the
National Sectrity Agency Described by the President to William H. Frist, former Senate
Majority Leader (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/dojOl1906.pdf.
122 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1809 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
123
Id. § 1809(a)(1).
124
S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).

2008]

AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE WAR ON TERRORISM

491

bers envisaged the legislation as a change to the Non-Detention Act of
1971, which provides: "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."' 125 Yet the Supreme Court, in the 2005 Hamdi case, decided
that the AUMF had authorized "so fundamental and accepted an incident to war" as detaining U.S. citizens who join the al Qaeda cause. 126
The Court did not find that the AUMF amended the Non-Detention
Act but rather that it satisfied the requirement that detention be pursuant to an Act of Congress. 1 27 And certainly if detaining U.S. citizens
constitutes a "fundamental ... incident to war,"' 28 then collecting intelligence on the enemy-often a prerequisite to the effective use of
armed force-must also constitute such a fundamental incident. So,
in light of the Hamdi decision, the Justice Department acted reasonably on a statutory argument to support the President's surveillance
activities.
Even so, the constitutional arguments comprise the strongest case
in favor of a presidential power to collect foreign intelligence. When
Congress accused the President of breaking the law, he could have
asked to address a joint session of Congress and argued his case. In
response to assertions that the idea of unchecked presidential power
was reminiscent of King George III, he could have quoted John Marshall in Marbury asserting that the Constitution confides certain powers entirely to the President's discretion and that an act of the
Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void. 12 9 He could have
read from The FederalistNo. 64, where John Jay explained that because
Congress could not be trusted to keep secrets, the Constitution left
the President "able to manage the business of intelligence as pru1 30
dence might suggest."
The President additionally might have noted that Henry Clay,
among the most famous members of the House of Representatives in
American history, declared in 1818 that Congress could not properly
inquire into expenditures for intelligence matters. 3 ' Clay's sentiment coincided with early appropriations for foreign affairs, which
provided:
[T]he President shall account specifically for all such expenditures
of the said money as in his judgment may be made public, and also
for the amount of such expenditures as he may think it advisable
125
126

130

18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2003).
See id.
Id.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 165-72 (1803).
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 393 Uohn Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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not to specify, and cause a regular statement and account thereof to
be laid before Congress annually ....132
1 33
The President could have further relied on the 1967 Katz case,
in which the Supreme Court first held that government wiretaps constituted a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, yet expressly excluded "national security" wiretaps from its holding. 13 4 The following
year, Congress enacted the first wiretap legislation, recognizing the
President's independent constitutional power in this area:

Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary... to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential
to the security of the United States, or to protect national security
1 35
information against foreign intelligence activities.
In fact, Congress did not begin demanding control over foreign
intelligence until the 1970s. The Legislature premised FISA on a false
1 36
assertion that the Supreme Court's decision in the 1972 Keith case
had "invited" Congress to legislate in the area of foreign intelligence.1 3 7 In reality, the Court addressed the issue of purely domestic
national security wiretaps in Keith.' 38 Indeed, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Powell repeatedly emphasized that the
case did not address the President's constitutional power to authorize
warrantless national-security wiretaps of foreign powers or their agents
in the United States. 139 Justice Powell did not suggest that Congress
seize control over the collection of foreign intelligence but rather suggested that Congress consider new legislation with respect to purely
140
domestic national-security threats, unrelated to any foreign power.
Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 128, 129.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See id. at 353, 358 n.23.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (2000).
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
See Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence SurveillanceAct: Hearing on Hi?. 5825 Before
the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies), availableat intelligence.house.gov/media/pdfs/CNSSStatmentRecord.pdf.
138
See Keith, 407 U.S. at 321-22.
139
See id. at 308, 321-22 ("It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited nature
of the question before the Court .... [T]he instant case requires no judgment on the
scope of the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers,
within or without this country .... We emphasize, before concluding this opinion, the
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this case involves only the domestic aspects
of national security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which
may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents." (footnote
omitted)).
140
See id. at 322 ("Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of standards and
procedures prescribed by Title III are necessarily applicable to this case. We recognize that
domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from
the surveillance of 'ordinary crime.'... Given these potential distinctions between Title III
132
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Instead, Congress used the occasion to pass the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
In support of his surveillance activities, the President might also
have quoted the testimony of President Carter's Attorney General,
Griffin Bell, who reminded the Senate that, as a mere statute, FISA
could not deprive the President of a power conferred by the Constitution. 14 1 Perhaps even more persuasively, he might have noted that
FISA established not only the FISA Court but also a FISA Court of
Review composed of Federal Appeals Court judges appointed by the
Chief Justice.1 42 And in 2002, the unanimous FISA Court of Review
observed that every federal court that has decided the issue has held
that the President does have inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information. 143 The Court of Review stated: "We take for granted that the
President does have that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA
14 4
could not encroach on the President's constitutional power."
The President should also have noted that, when addressing issues of public safety, the Supreme Court has long held that Fourth
Amendment "searches" do not always require individualized suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. For example, in the 1989 Von Raab
case, the Court explained:
While we have often emphasized, and reiterate today, that a search
must be supported, as a general matter, by a warrant issued upon
probable cause .... our decision in Railway Labor Executives reaffirms
the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable
cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance.... As we note in Railway LaborExecutives, our cases establish
that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is
necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against
the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to
require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the
45
particular context.'
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III." (emphasis added)).
141
See Foreign Intelligence SurveillanceAct of 1977: Hearingson H.R. 5794, H.R 9745, H.t
7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the H. Subcomm. on Legis. of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 15 (1978) (statement of Griffin Bell, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
142
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. IV
2004).
See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
Id.
145
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (citations omitted).
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With regard to this balancing test, the Court has repeatedly noted
that "[i] t is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the Nation." 14 6 In Von Raab the
Court cited the search of airline passengers to prevent hijackings or
acts of terror as an example of a Fourth Amendment search that did
not require a warrant:
The point is well illustrated also by the Federal Government's
practice of requiring the search of all passengers seeking to board
commercial airliners, as well as the search of their carry-on luggage,
without any basis for suspecting any particular passenger of an untoward motive. Applying our precedents dealing with administrative
searches . . . the lower courts that have considered the question
have consistently concluded that such searches are reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. As Judge Friendly explained in a
leading case upholding such searches:
"When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing
up of a large airplane, that danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the
purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage .... "147
Next, the President might have cataloged some of the damage to
American national security caused by this congressional usurpation of
his authority. He might have noted that FBI lawyer Colleen Rowley
could not obtain a warrant to examine Zacharais Moussaoui's laptop
computer because Congress failed to anticipate the possibility that a
"lone-wolf' foreign terrorist might be a legitimate subject for government surveillance and not because of bureaucratic incompetence at
the FBI's Washington headquarters. The FBI lawyers merely enforced
the law. In December 2004, Congress quietly amended FISA to per14 8
mit warrants for lone-wolf terrorists.
General Michael Hayden, who served as Director of the National
Security Agency from 1999 to 2005, told an audience at the National
Press Club in early 2006: "Had [the NSA terrorist surveillance program] been in effect prior to 9/11, it is my professional judgment that
we would have detected some of the 9/11 al Qaeda operatives in the
United States, and we would have identified them as such." 149 While
146

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S.

500, 509 (1964)).
147
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500
(2d Cir. 1974)) (citations omitted).
148
See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1) (C) (Supp. IV 2004).
149
General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Office of National Intelligence, Former Dir. of Nat'l Sec. Agency, Address to the National
Press Club: What American Intelligence & Especially the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend
the Nation (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/haydenO1
2306.html.
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General Hayden did not say that had the NSA and FBI identified these
al Qaeda operatives, they would have tracked their activities and quite
possibly prevented the 9/11 attacks, one can easily imagine such an
outcome.
Ultimately, the TSP dispute turns not on whether the President
thinks he is "above the law" but on which "law" is superior: the Constitution or a mere statute passed by Congress. To solve the dispute, the
President would only need to quote John Marshall. Instead, the Administration relied on the argument that the AUMF had somehow
changed FISA. Irrespective of the actual merits of the issue, even in
the legal community, this argument did not pass the straight-face test
with many people. Professor Yoo concludes: "Commonsense changes
in surveillance law earlier might have stopped al Qaeda before they
murdered three thousand people.' l5 I believe he is correct.
GUANTANAMO, DETAINEE TREATMENT, AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Chapters Six through Eight address the related issues of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, interrogation techniques
and "torture," and the use of military tribunals in the war on terrorism. Professor Yoo does well to address these issues both because he
played a key role on each issue during his government service and
because criticism of the Administration's handling of the war has
largely focused on these issues.
On some of these issues, Professor Yoo provides excellent commentary. He correctly notes that "[t]he rules of war permit the capture and detention of the enemy without trial, because the purpose of
detention is to remove combatants from action."' 15 1 He also correctly
observes that "[e]ven under the Geneva Conventions ....

a POW has

no right to an attorney unless he is being tried for violations of the
52
laws of war."1
Perhaps most controversially, though, Professor Yoo defends the
Bush Administration's interrogation techniques. Because he does not
recognize that Common Article 3 applies, Professor Yoo focuses on
establishing that the techniques used to extract information fell short
of torture. 153 He asserts that the well-documented abuses at Abu
Ghraib "were solely the acts of individuals," which the government did
not order or authorize in any way. 154 Professor Yoo's assertion is con150

Yoo, supra note 3, at 97.
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Id. at 129.
Id. at 152.
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See id. at 171.
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Id. at 194.
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sistent with the findings of several investigatory bodies, including one
55
headed by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
There is likely broad agreement that if the government had a
"ticking time bomb" scenario involving a detainee with information
that might save tens or even hundreds of thousands of innocent lives,
extraordinary interrogation techniques would be morally justified
even if illegal. Professor Yoo quotes Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY)
as declaring during a Senate hearing that "very few people in this
room or in America ... would say that torture should never, ever be

used, particularly if thousands of lives are at stake." 156 Similarly, Professor Yoo notes that Senator John McCain (R-AZ) "concedes that the
President ought to violate his own law if al Qaeda has hidden a nuclear bomb in New York and American intelligence captures one of
the plotters. 'You do what you have to do,' McCain said in the fall of
"
2005 . 157
The likelihood of such a ticking time bomb scenario ever occurring is not great, and even in such a situation the effectiveness of torture at extracting usable evidence is questionable. Professor Yoo
describes a case in which Filipino authorities inflicted "terrible physical abuse" on an al Qaeda operative that ultimately produced information that prevented a plot to destroy twelve U.S. airliners flying across
the Pacific. 158 Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
recently remarked that the controversial CIA interrogation program
has produced greater information "than the FBI, the Central Intelli59
gence Agency, and the National Security Agency put together."
Others claim that research shows coercive interrogation seldom works
160
and that more traditional techniques are far more effective.
However, even if abusing detainees can produce useful intelligence, there are serious moral, legal, and prudential considerations
involved. The Convention Against Torture, to which the United
States is a party, does not permit any derogation, even during
wartime.'61
See JAMEs R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REDOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 5 (2004) ("The pictured abuses . . . were not part of
authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at intelligence targets. They represent deviant behavior and a failure of military leadership and discipline.").
156 Yoo, supra note 3, at 172.
157
Id. at 172-73.
158 Id. at 190.
159 Stephen F. Hayes, Op-Ed., The Cheney Imperative, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at Al 3.
160
See Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641,
653 (2005) ("To be sure, there is abundant evidence that torture is not effective either as
an interrogation tactic or as an information-extracting device.").
161
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 2, para. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or
any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.").
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It is important to understand that Professor Yoo was mistaken in
his view that Common Article 3 did not apply to the use of coercive
interrogation techniques in the war on terrorism.1 6 2 The Supreme
Court has already resolved this issue in Hamdan 6 3 Thus, any interrogation techniques that involve physical abuse or constitute inhumane
treatment are violations of the Geneva Conventions. Serious physical
abuse of detainees is a war crime for which everyone involved-U.S.
interrogators, their superiors who know or should know of their activities, and others up the chain of command who ordered, facilitated, or
otherwise bear responsibility for the abuse-is liable, and any of the
193 other parties to the Conventions may try them as war criminals.
This is a serious matter, particularly because there is no statute of limitations for war crimes 164 and the U.S. government has an obligation to
protect its employees from such risks by not directing or authorizing
conduct that constitutes a war crime.
Professor Yoo makes an interesting argument that during wartime, U.S. Presidents have the constitutional power to violate international law, as well as legislative statutes, that they feel improperly
infringe on their constitutional powers. 165 On the first point he is certainly right) 66 He is correct on the second point as well, to the extent
that that statute exceeds the clear constitutional powers of Congress
and usurps executive discretion. However, in this instance it is not
clear that Professor Yoo gave sufficient attention to the expressed
power of Congress to "define and punish ...Offenses against the Law
of Nations."'167 On the issue of torture and detainee treatment, I also
fear that Professor Yoo and his colleagues in the Bush Administration
may have focused too heavily upon clever legal arguments and not
enough on wise public policy. Even if Presidents do have the power to
disregard the law, it does not follow that they should exercise that
162
Yoo, supra note 3, at 235-36 ("The Court only addressed the use of military commissions [in Hamdan]. It did not hold them unconstitutional, nor did it revisit its Hamdi
decision of two years ago which allows the government to hold terrorists until the end of
fighting.... It limited itself to interpreting two provisions of the UCMJ, one which declared that passage of the UCMJ was not meant to deprive military commissions of their
usual jurisdiction, and another requiring the use of courts-martial procedures except
where not practical.").
163
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(holding that Common Article 3 applies to cases involving al Qaeda members even though

they are not associated with parties that are signatories to the treaty).
164
See Convention on the Non-Applicability of the Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity art. 1(a), Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/plimit.htm.
165
SeeYoo, supra note 3, at 183-86.
166
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power. The United States benefits tremendously from international
law, and electing to violate the Geneva Conventions will weaken the
country's credibility to enforce other rules against other states, including Iran's and North Korea's obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty.
Professor Yoo's discussion of the use of military tribunals is more
impressive than his discussion of abusive interrogation techniques,
and he provides anecdotal accounts to illustrate the risks and difficulties of prosecuting terrorists in federal district courts. Professor Yoo
also raises important questions about the modern trend in Congress
of providing civil remedies to foreign nationals who assert that U.S.
government employees have violated their rights, even when the employee acted in good faith during times of war or national security
emergency. Does the United States really want al Qaeda operatives to
have access to our courts and perhaps reap millions of dollars in damages as opposed to dealing with misconduct administratively (e.g., by
demoting or even discharging a government employee who fails to
comply with established minimization procedures) or perhaps using
the criminal justice system to punish flagrant and intentional violations of the law? Professor Yoo quotes Justice Robert Jackson in the
majority opinion in the 1950 Eisentrager1 68 case as observing:
[I] t would be difficult to devise a more effective fettering of a field
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce
to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to
1 69
the legal defensive at home.

Professor Yoo asserts that during the trial of Omar Abdel
Rahman, the so-called "blind sheikh" convicted of masterminding the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the defendant used rules of discovery to compel the Government to disclose the names of two hundred "unindicted coconspirators," and the list was delivered to Osama
1 70
bin Laden within days after the Government produced it in court.
Presumably, this treasure trove of information informed bin Laden
who among his agents had been compromised and who could be used
for terrorist attacks because their identities had not yet become
known to American intelligence agencies. Professor Yoo also contends that Zacharias Moussaoui, the only plotter of the 9/11 attacks to
stand trial, 1 71 used the American criminal justice system "to force the
government to reveal important secrets in the war against al
168
169
170
171

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Yoo, supra note 3, at 157.

Id. at 212.
See id. at 210.
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Qaeda."'172 Indeed, he points to the Moussaoui trial as "clear evidence" that civil courts are not the solution to the war on terrorism. 1 73Whether disclosures result from judicial proceedings or from
more traditional leaks by members of Congress or the Executive
branch, the harm can be devastating. Professor Yoo writes that 'Just
hours after information leaked in the 1990s that U.S. intelligence
could intercept calls on bin Laden's cell phone, he stopped using
it.,174

Professor Yoo also argues that the Bush Administration's biggest
policy failure was its inability to actually try terrorists. He complains:
Nearly five years later, the Defense Department still hasn't tried
a single terrorist. Military commissions have been the Bush administration's most conspicuous policy failure in the war against al
Qaeda. The delay has been due to the sheer multitude of issues
involved in building a working court system from scratch. There
were no off-the-shelf procedures or lists of war crimes to use. The
Defense Department wanted a showcase of military justice at its finest, with rules of substance and procedures that would withstand
any scrutiny, both at home and abroad. It was a laudable goal, but it
inevitably led to long bureaucratic delays among all the involved
agencies.... Military commissions became another flash point in
the struggle pitting the military establishment against Rumsfeld and
his civilian advisers .... 175
There is nothing wrong with using military courts to try enemy
combatants in the war on terrorism so long as the procedures are just
and comply with international law. Much of the knee-jerk opposition
to such tribunals reflects ignorance about both military tribunals and
international law. After all, American military personnel who break
the law in the war on terrorism are tried by military courts. Professor
Yoo writes the following about the criticism of military courts:
This viewpoint displays a serious lack of understanding of the
military justice system. Millions of American servicemen and women serve today under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). That system has developed over many decades, and it provides a fair and open trial. Unlike our criminal trials, in which jurors are selected for their ignorance, military tribunals are
populated by officers who are college graduates with extensive pro176
fessional knowledge.
172

Id. at 217.

Id. at 210 ("The story of Moussaoui's trial and conviction shows why the civilian
criminal justice system is inadequate to the task of fighting al Qaeda and the threat of mass
attacks on American cities.").
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Professor Yoo makes a very valid point, and, having been personally involved in defending soldiers as an Army infantry recon platoon
leader nearly four decades ago, I continue to believe that the military
justice system, on the whole, is better at producing just outcomes than
most federal or state criminal justice systems.
However, Professor Yoo failed to make the point that international law not only permits the trial of POWs by military courts but in
most circumstances mandates it. Thus, Article 84 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War provides:
A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the
existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil
courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power
in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed
77
by the prisoner of war.1

In my view, some of the genuine "heroes" in the war against terrorism have been some of the Judge Advocates General of our uniformed services and their staffs, as well as people like former Navy
General Counsel Alberto Mora, who courageously stood up and insisted that detainees be treated humanely and that military tribunals
fully conform to international law and fundamental principles of fairness. 178 The country's uniformed military lawyers deserve the nation's
gratitude for their courageous struggle to assure that all trials fully
comply with established norms of international law.
CONCLUSION

Whatever one thinks about the issues of executive power over national security that ProfessorJohn Yoo discusses in War by Other Means,
it is important to understand all sides of the arguments. Professor Yoo
is a very able legal scholar who was a major player in the government
while it addressed many of the most important legal issues of the war
on terrorism. I personally think that he was right on many issues but
terribly wrong on others. Regardless of how one views his contributions to this legal area, this book is important, and anyone seriously
interested in understanding these issues should read it.

Geneva Convention, supra note 69, art. 84.
See Yoo, supra note 3, at 196 ("Alberto Mora, then the Navy's general counsel...
protested the use of coercive interrogation and attempted to stand in the way of the working group's conclusions."); see also News Release, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and
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Murtha Honored with the 2006JFK Profile in Courage Award (Mar 22, 2006), http://www.
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